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On “The Corporation,” the Film

By - January 20, 2012

If you read my Predictions for 2012, you’ll recall that #6 was “The Corporation” Becomes A Central Societal Question Mark.

We aren’t very far into the year, and signs of this coming true are all around. The “Occupy” movement seems to have found a central theme to its 2012 movement around overturning “the corporation as a person,” and some legislators are supporting that concept.

We’ll see if this goes anywhere, but I wanted to note, as I didn’t fairly do in my prediction post, the role that “The Corporation”  played in my thinking. I finally watched this 2003 documentary over the holidays. Its promoters still maintain an ongoing community here, and it doesn’t take long to determine that this film has a very strong, classically liberal point of view about the role corporations play in our society.

If you can manage the film’s rather heavy handed approach to the topic, you’ll learn a lot about how we got to the point we’re at with the Citizens United case. Obviously the film was made well before that case, but it certainly foreshadowed it. I certainly recommend it to anyone who wants the backstory – with a healthy side of scare tactics – of the corporation’s rise in American society.

My next review will be Ray Kurzweil’s The Singularity Is Near, a 2005 book I finished a few weeks ago. I’m currently reading Steven Johnson’s Where Good Ideas Come From: The Natural History of Innovation, which is a pleasure.

Other books I’ve reviewed:

What Technology Wants by Kevin Kelly (my review)

Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other by Sherry Turkle (my review)

The Information: A History, a Theory, a Flood by James Gleick (my review)

In The Plex: How Google Thinks, Works, and Shapes Our Lives by Steven Levy (my review)

The Future of the Internet–And How to Stop It by Jonathan Zittrain (my review)

The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century by George Friedman (my review)

Physics of the Future: How Science Will Shape Human Destiny and Our Daily Lives by the Year 2100 by Michio Kaku (my review)

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What Might A Facebook Search Engine Look Like?

By - January 16, 2012

(image) Dialing in from the department of Pure Speculation…

As we all attempt to digest the implications of last week’s Google+ integration, I’ve also be thinking about Facebook’s next moves. There’s been plenty of speculation in the past that Facebook might compete with Google directly – by creating a full web search engine. After all, with the Open Graph and in particular, all those Like buttons, Facebook is getting a pretty good proxy of pages across the web, and indexing those pages in some way might prove pretty useful.

But I don’t think Facebook will create a search engine, at least not in the way we think about search today. For “traditional” web search, Facebook can lean on its partner Microsoft, which has a very good product in Bing. I find it more interesting to think about what “search problem” Facebook might solve in the future that Google simply can’t.

And that problem could be the very same problem (or opportunity) that Google can’t currently solve for, the very same problem that drove Google to integrate Google+ into its main search index: that of personalized search.

As I wrote over the past week, I believe the dominant search paradigm – that of crawling a free and open web, then displaying the best results for any particular query – has been broken by the rise of Facebook on the one hand, and the app economy on the other. Both of these developments are driven by personalization – the rise of “social.”

Both Facebook and the app economy are invisible to Google’s crawlers. To be fair, there are billions of Facebook pages in Google’s index, but it’s near impossible to “organize them and make them universally available” without Facebook’s secret sauce (its social graph and related logged in data). This is what those 2009 negotiations broke down over, after all.

The app economy, on the other hand, is just plain invisible to anyone. Sure, you can go to one of ten or so app stores and search for apps to use, but you sure can’t search apps the way you search, say, a web site. Why? First, the use case of apps, for the most part, is entirely personal, so apps have not been built to be “searchable.” I find this extremely frustrating, because why wouldn’t I want to “Google” the hundreds of rides and runs I’ve logged on my GPS app, as one example?

Secondly, the app economy is invisible to Google because data use policies of the dominant app universe – Apple – make it nearly impossible to create a navigable link economy between apps, so developers simply don’t do it. And as we all know, without a navigable link economy, “traditional” search breaks down.

Now, this link economy may well be rebuilt in a way that can be crawled, through up and coming standards like HTML5 and Telehash. But it’s going to take a lot of time for the app world to migrate to these standards, and I don’t know that open standards like these will necessarily win. Not when there’s a platform that already exists that can tie them together.

What platform is that, you might ask? Why, Facebook, of course.

Stick with me here. Imagine a world where the majority of app builders integrate with Facebook’s Open Graph, instrumenting your personal data through Facebook such that your data becomes searchable. (If you think that’s crazy, remember how most major companies and app services have already fallen all over themselves to leverage Open Graph). Then, all that data is hoovered into Facebook’s “search index”, and integrated with your personal social graph. Facebook then builds an interface to all you app data, add in your Facebook social graph data, and then perhaps tosses in a side of Bing so you can have the whole web as a backdrop, should you care to.

Voila – you’ve got yourself a truly personalized new kind of search engine. A Facebook search engine, one that searches your world, apps, Facebook and all.

Strangers things will probably happen. What do you think?

Update: Facebook’s getting one step closer this week…

 

It’s Not About Search Anymore, It’s About Deals

By - January 14, 2012

As in, who gets the best deal, why didn’t that deal go down, how do I get a deal, what should the deal terms be?

This is of course in the air given the whole Google+ fracas, but it’s part of a larger framework I’m thinking through and hope to write about. On the issue of “deals,” however, a little sketching out loud seems worthwhile.

Go read this piece: Facebook+Spotify: An ‘Unfair, Insider, Anti-Competitive’ Relationship…

It’s a common lament: A small developer who feels boxed out by whoever got the sweet deal. In this case, it’s on Facebook, but we all know it happens inside the Apple store as well (whoever gets top billing, gets sales).  Closed ecosystems controlled by one company create this dynamic. There’s only so much real estate, and the owner of the land gets to determine the most profitable use of it.

Google now appears to be acting the same way, cutting Google+ a “deal” so to speak, giving it the best real estate for all manner of search queries. That’s not how search was supposed to work. Search was supposed to reflect the ongoing conversation happening across all aspects of the Internet. If you were that small developer, you worked hard to get your service noticed on the web, and as it picked up a following, search would notice, start raising your profile in search results, and a virtuous loop began. Is that concept now dead?

Search isn’t supposed to be about cutting a deal to get your company’s wares to the top of relevant searches. In my reporting over the past week, most of my source conversations have been about failed deals – between Google and Facebook, or Google and Twitter. But search is supposed to be about showing the best results to consumers based on objective (or at least defensible and understandable) parameters, parameters *unrelated to the search engine itself.*

With Google Search Plus Your World (shortened by many to SPYW, which is just laughably bad as an acronym), it’s rather hard to tell the two apart anymore. When I wrote last year that Google = Google+, I meant it from a brand perspective. I didn’t realize how literal it’s become. Because with SPYW, all I’m getting is Google+ at the top of my results. I know I can turn SPYW off, and I probably will. Or, I can bail on Google+ altogether. But there is a real conundrum in doing so – more on that in my next post.

Some are arguing that search is no longer about results anymore, and that for years search has pretty much been about paid inclusion anyway (either paid through SEO,  or paid through ads, which increasingly don’t look like ads). That now, Google is focusing entirely on getting you an answer, and surfacing that answer right there on the results page. Perhaps the “right answer” is best found through cutting deals.

But I hope not. Because for me, search is a journey, not an answer.

This SPYW story has raised so many questions, it’s rather hard to sort through them all. I guess I’ll just keep writing till I feel like the writing’s done…

Related:

Hitler Is Pissed About Google+

Google Responds: No,That’s Not How Facebook Deal Went Down (Oh, And I Say: The Search Paradigm Is Broken)

Compete To Death, or Cooperate to Compete?

Twitter Statement on Google+ Integration with Google Search

Search, Plus Your World, As Long As It’s Our World

Google Responds: No,That’s Not How Facebook Deal Went Down (Oh, And I Say: The Search Paradigm Is Broken)

By - January 13, 2012

(image) I’ve just been sent an official response from Google to the updated version of my story posted yesterday (Compete To Death, or Cooperate to Compete?). In that story, I reported about 2009 negotiations over incorporation of Facebook data into Google search. I quoted a source familiar with the negotiations on the Facebook side, who told me  “Senior executives at Google insisted that for technical reasons all information would need to be public and available to all,” and “The only reason Facebook has a Bing integration and not a Google integration is that Bing agreed to terms for protecting user privacy that Google would not.”

I’ve now had conversations with a source familiar with Google’s side of the story, and to say the company disagrees with how Facebook characterized the negotiations is to put it mildly. I’ve also spoken to my Facebook source, who has clarified some nuance as well. To get started, here’s the official, on the record statement, from Rachel Whetstone, SVP Global Communications and Public Affairs:

“We want to set the record straight. In 2009, we were negotiating with Facebook over access to its data, as has been reported.  To claim that the we couldn’t reach an agreement because Google wanted to make private data publicly available is simply untrue.”

My source familiar with Google’s side of the story goes further, and gave me more detail on why the deal went south, at least from Google’s point of view. According to this source, as part of the deal terms Facebook insisted that Google agree to not use publicly available Facebook information to build out a “social service.” The two sides had already agreed that Google would not use Facebook’s firehose (or private) data to build such a service, my source says.

So what does “publicly available” mean? Well, that’d be Facebook pages that any search engine can crawl – information on Facebook that people *want* search engines to know about. This is compared to the firehose data that was the core asset being discussed between the parties. This firehose data is what Google would need in order to surface personal Facebook pages relevant to you in the context of a search query. (So, for example, if you were my friend on Facebook, and you searched for “Battelle soccer” on Google, then with the proposed deal, you’d see pictures of my kids’ soccer games that I had posted to Facebook).

Apparently, Google believed that Facebook’s demand around public information could be interpreted  as applying to how Google’s own search service was delivered, not to mention how it (or other products) might evolve. Interpretation is always where the devil is in these deals. Who’s to say, after all, that Google’s “social search” is not a “social service”? And Google Pages, Maps, etc. – those are arguably social in nature, or will be in the future.

Google balked at this language, and the deal fell apart. My Google source also disputes the claim that Google balked at being able to technically separate public from private data. Conversely, my Facebook source counters that the real issue of public vs. private had to do with Google’s refusal to honor changes in privacy settings over time – for example, if I deleted those soccer pictures, they should also be deleted from Google’s index. There’s a point where this all devolves to she said/he said, because the deal never happened, and to be honest, there are larger points to make.

So let’s start with this: If Facebook indeed demanded that Google not use publicly available Facebook data, it’s certainly understandable why Google wouldn’t agree to the deal. It may not seem obvious, but there is an awful lot of publicly available Facebook pages and data out there. Starbucks, for example, is more than happy to let anyone see its Facebook page, no matter if you’re logged in or not. And then there’s all that Facebook open graph data out on the public web – tons of sites show Facebook status updates, like counts and so on in a public fashion. In short, asking Google to not leverage that data in anything that might constitute a “social service” is anathema to a company who claims its mission to crawl all publicly available information, organize it, and make it available.

It’s one thing to ask that Google not use Facebook’s own social graph and private data to build new social services – after all, the social graph is Facebook’s crown jewels. But it’s quite another thing to ask Google to ignore other public information completely.

From Google’s point of view, Facebook was crippling future products and services that Google might create, which was tantamount to an insurance policy of sorts that Google wouldn’t become a strong competitor, at least not one that  leverages public information from Facebook. Google balked. If Facebook’s demand could have been interpreted as also applying to Google’s search results, well, that’s a stone cold deal killer.

I certainly understand why Facebook might ask for what they did, it’s not crazy. Google might well have responded by narrowing the deal, saying “Fine, you don’t build a search engine, and we won’t build a social network. But we should have the right to create other kinds of social services.” As far as I know, Google didn’t chose to say that. (Microsoft apparently did). And I think I know why: The two companies realized they were dancing on the head of a pin. Search = social, social = search. They couldn’t figure out a way to tease the two apart. Microsoft has cast its lot with Facebook, Google, not so much.

When high stakes deals fall apart, both sides usually claim the other is at fault, and that certainly seems to be the case here. It’s also the case with the Twitter deal, which I’ve gotten a fair amount of new information about as well. I hope to dig into that in another post. For now, I want to pull back a second and comment on what I think is really going on here, at least from the perspective of a longer view.

Our Cherished Search Paradigm Is Broken (But We Will Fix It….Eventually)

I think what we have here is a clear indication that the search paradigm we’ve operated under for a decade or so is broken. That paradigm stems from Google’s original letter to shareholders in 2004. Remember this line?Our search results are the best we know how to produce. They are unbiased and objective, and we do not accept payment for them or for inclusion or more frequent updating.

In many cases, it’s simply naive to claim Google is unbiased or objective. Google often favors its own properties over others, as Danny points out in Real-Life Examples Of How Google’s “Search Plus” Pushes Google+ Over Relevancy and others have also detailed. But there is a reason: if you’re going to show results from all other possible contenders, replete with their associated UI and functional bells and whistles (as Google does with its own Maps, Pages, Plus etc.), well, it’s nearly impossible now to determine which service is the right answer to a particular person’s query. Not to mention, you need to put a deal in place to get all the functionality of the service. Instead, Google has opted, in many cases, to go with their own stuff.

This is not a new idea, by the way. Yahoo’s been doing it this way from the beginning. The contentious issue is that biasing some results toward Google’s own products runs counter to Google’s founding philosophy.

I have a theory as to why all this is happening, and I don’t entirely blame Google. Back when search wasn’t personalized, Google could defensibly say that one service was better than another because it got more traffic, was linked to more (better PageRank), and so on. Back when everyone got the same results and the web was one homogenous glob of HTML, well, you could claim “this is the best result for the general population.” But personalized search has broken that framework – I lamented this back in 2008 with this post: Search Was Our Social Glue. But That Is Dissolving (more here).

With the rise of Facebook and the app economy, the problem of search has become terribly complicated. If you want to have results from Facebook in your search, well, that search service has to do a deal with Facebook. But what if you want results from your running app (I have hundreds of rides and runs logged on AllSportGPS, for example)? Or Instagram? Or Path, for that matter? Do they all have to do deals with Google and Bing? There are so many unconnected pieces of the Internet now (millions of apps, most of our own Facebook experiences, etc. etc.) that what’s a good personal result for one person is not necessarily good for another. If Google is to stay true to its original mission, it needs a new framework and a massive number of new signals – new glue – to put the pieces back together.

There are several ways to resolve this, and in another post, I hope to explore them (one of them, of course, is simply that everyone should just go through Facebook. That’s the vision of Open Graph). But for now, I’m just going to say this: The issues raised by this kerfuffle are far larger than Google vs. Facebook, or Google vs. Twitter. We are in the midst of a major search paradigm shift, and there will be far more tears before it gets resolved. But resolve it must, and resolve it will.

Compete To Death, or Cooperate to Compete?

By - January 11, 2012

(image) **Updated at 3 PM PST with more info about Facebook/Google negotiations…please read to the bottom…**

In today’s business climate, it’s not normal for corporations to cooperate with each other when it comes to sharing core assets. In fact, it’s rather unusual. Even when businesses do share, it’s usually for some ulterior motive, a laying of groundwork for future chess moves which insure eventual domination over the competition.

Such is the way of business, particularly at the highest and largest levels, such as those now inhabited by top Internet players.

Allow me to posit that this philosophy is going to change over the next few decades, and further, indulge me as I try to apply a new approach to a very present case study: That of Google, Facebook, and Twitter as it relates to Google’s search index and the two social services’ valuable social interaction datasets.

This may take a while, and I will most likely get a fair bit wrong. But it seems worth a shot, so if you feel like settling in for some Thinking Out Loud, please come along.

First, some abridged background. Back in 2009, on the Web 2 Summit stage of all places (yes, I was the emcee), Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Twitter announced a flurry of deals, some of which were worked out in a last minute fury of negotiations. Early in the conference Microsoft announced it would incorporate Twitter and Facebook feeds into its new search engine Bing. Not to be outdone, Google announced a deal with Twitter the next day. However, Google did not announce a deal with Facebook, and the two companies have never come to terms. Meanwhile, Microsoft has continued to deepen its relationship with Facebook data, to the point of viewing that relationship as a key differentiator between Bing and Google search.

All of these deals have business terms, some of them financial, all with limits on how data is used and presented, I would presume. Marissa Mayer of Google told me on the Web 2 stage that there were “financial terms” in Google’s deal with Twitter, but would not give me any details (nor should she have, frankly).

Fast forward to the middle of last year, when the Google/Twitter deal was set to expire. At about the same time as renewal was being negotiated, Google launched Google+, a clear Facebook and Twitter competitor. For reasons that seem in dispute (Google said yesterday Twitter walked away, Twitter has not made a public statement about why things fell apart), the renewal never happened.

And then yesterday, Google incorporated Google+  results into its main search index, sparking a debate in the blogosphere that rages on today – Is Google acting like a monopolist? Does Facebook or Twitter have a “right” to be included in Google results? Why didn’t Google try to negotiate inclusion with its rivals prior to making such a clearly self-serving move?

Google execs, including Chair Eric Schmidt, told SEL’s Danny Sullivan that the company would be happy to talk to both companies to figure out ways to incorporate Twitter and Facebook into Google search, but clearly, those talks could have happened prior to the G+ launch, and they didn’t (or they did, and did not work out – I honestly have no idea). When Danny pointed out that Twitter pages are publicly available, Schmidt demurred, saying that Google prefers to “have a conversation” with a company before using its pages in such a wholesale fashion (er, so did they have one, or not? Anyway…). He has a point (commercial deals are de-rigueur), but…that conversation happened last year, and apparently ended without a deal. And around we go…

What’s clear is this: All the companies involved in this great data spat are acting in what they believe to be their own self interest, and the greatest potential loser, at least in the short term, is the search consumer, who will not be seeing “all the world’s information” but rather “that information which is readily available to Google on terms Google prefers.”

The key to that last sentence is the phrase “what they believe to be their own self interest.” Because I think there’s an argument that, in fact, their true self interest is to open up and share with each other.

Am I nuts? Perhaps. But indulge my insanity for a bit.

The Cost of Blinkered Competition

Back in the Web 1.0 days, when I was running The Industry Standard, I had a number of strong competitors. It’s probably fair to say we didn’t like each other much – we competed daily for news stories, advertiser dollars, and the loyalty of readers. The market for information about the tech industry was limited – there were only so many people interested in our products, and only so much time in the day for them to engage with us.

My strategy to win was clear: We’d make the best product, have the best people, and we’d win on quality. When I heard about one of our competitors badmouthing us, I’d try to ignore it – we were winning anyway: We had the dominant marketshare, the most revenues ($120mm in 2000, with $21mm in EBIDTA), and the best product.

Then something strange happened: an emissary from a competitor called and asked for a meeting. Intrigued, I took it, and was surprised by his offer: Let’s put our two companies together. Apart, he argued, we were simply tearing each other down. Together, we could consolidate the market and insure a long term win.

I considered his idea, but for various reasons, we didn’t take him up on it. I felt like we had the dominant position, that his offer was driven by weakness, not intellectual soundness, and I also felt that a combination would require that my shareholders take on too much dilution.

Two years later, both of us were out of business.

Now, I’m not sure it would have mattered, given the great crash of 2001. But what is certainly true is that I could have thought a bit deeper about what this fellow was proposing. Back in the days of print-bound information, we were essentially competing on what were publicly available assets: stories, particularly interpretations and reportage around those stories, and people: writers, editors, ad sales executives, and management. Short of combining companies, there wasn’t really any other way for us to collaborate, or at least, so I thought.

But perhaps there could have been. It’s been more than a decade since that meeting, and I still wonder: perhaps we could have shared back-end resources like operations, publishing contracts, etc. and saved tens of millions of dollars. We’d compete just on how we leveraged those public assets (stories, people). Perhaps we might have survived the wipeout of the dot com crash. We’ll never know. Since those publications died, the blogosphere has claimed the market, and now it’s far larger than the one we lost back in 2001. Of course I started Federated Media to participate in that model, and now FM has as large a revenue run rate as the Industry Standard, across a far more diverse market.

Why am I bringing this up? Because I think there’s a win-win in this whole Google/Facebook/Twitter dust up, but it’s going to take some Thinking Differently to make it happen.

Imagine Twitter and Facebook offer efficient access to all of their “public” pages – those that its users are happy to share with anyone (or even just to their pre-defined “circles”) – to Google under some set of reasonable usage terms. Financial terms would be minimal – perhaps just enough to cover the costs of serving such a large firehose of data to the search giant. Imagine further that Google, in return, agrees to incorporate this user data in a fashion that is fair – ie doesn’t favor any service over any other – be it Twitter, Google+, or Facebook.

Now, negotiating what is “fair” will be complicated, and honestly, should be subject to iteration as all parties learn usage patterns. And of course all this should be subject to consumer control – if I want to see only Twitter or Facebook or Google+ results in particular searches (or all results for that matter), I should have that right.

And this leads me to my point. Such a set up, regardless of how painful it might be to get right, would create a shared class of assets that would have to compete at the level of the consumer. In other words, the best service for the query wins.

That’s always been Google’s stated philosophy: the best answer for the question at hand. Danny gets to this point in a piece posted last night (which I just saw as I was writing this): Search Engines Should Be Like Santa From “Miracle On 34th Street”. In it he argues that Google’s great strength has been its pattern of sending people to its competitors. And he upbraids Google for violating that principle with its Google+ integration.

It doesn’t have to be this way. It’s not only Google that’s at fault here. Facebook won’t share with Google on any terms, Facebook and Google have not been able to come to terms on how to share data (more on that below*), and Twitter clearly wants some kind of value if it is to share its complete firehose with the search giant. Imagine if all three were to agree on minimal terms, creating a public commons of social data. Yes, that would put Google in an extreme position of trust (not to mention imperil its toddler Google+ service), but covenants can be put in place that allow parties to terminate sharing for clear breaches which demonstrate one party favoring itself over others.

Were such a public commons to be created, then the real competition could start: at the level of how each service interprets that data, and adds value to it in various ways.

Four years ago to the month, I wrote this post: It’s Time For Services on The Web to Compete On More Than Data

In it I said: It’s time that services on the web compete on more than just the data they aggregate….

I think in the end, Facebook will win based on the services it provides for that data. Set the data free, and it will come back to roost wherever it’s best used. And if Facebook doesn’t win that race, well, it’ll lose over time anyway. Such a move is entirely in line with the company’s nascent philosophy, and would be a massively popular move within the ouroborosphere (my name for all things Techmeme).

Compete on service, Facebook, it’s where the world is headed anyway!

Two and a half years ago, as it became clear Facebook’s “nascent philosophy” had changed (and as Twitter rose in stature), I followed up with this post: Google v. Facebook? What We Learn from Twitter. In that post, I said:

 

I think it’s a major strategic mistake to not offer (Facebook’s pages and social graph) to Google (and anyone else that wants to crawl it.) In fact, I’d argue that the right thing to do is to make just about everything possible available to Google to crawl, then sit back and watch while Google struggles with whether or not to “organize it and make it universally available.” A regular damned if you do, damned if you don’t scenario, that….

For an example of what I mean, look no further than Twitter. That service makes every single tweet available as a crawlable resource. And Google certainly is crawling Twitter pages, but the key thing to watch is whether the service is surfacing “superfresh” results when the query merits it. So far, the answer is a definitive NO.

Why?

Well, perhaps I’m being cynical, but I think it’s because Google doesn’t want to push massive value and traffic to Twitter without a business deal in place where it gets to monetize those real time results.

Is that “organizing the world’s information and making it universally available?” Well, no. At least, not yet.

By making all its information available to Google’s crawlers (and fixing its terrible URL structure in the process), Facebook could shine an awfully bright light on this interesting conflict (of) interest.

Thanks to Google’s inclusion of Google+ in its search index, that light has now been shone, and what we’re seeing isn’t all good. I’m of the opinion that a few years from now, each and every one of us will have the expectation and the right to incorporate our own social data into web-wide queries. If the key parties involved in search and social today don’t figure out a way to make that happen, well, they may end up just like The Industry Standard did back in 2001.
But not to worry, someone else will come along, pick up the pieces, and figure out how to play a more cooperative and federated game.
*Update: I’ve heard from a source with knowledge of the Facebook/Google negotiations over integration of Facebook’s data into Google’s search index. This source – who while very credible does come from Facebook’s side of the debate – explained to me that during the 2009 negotiations, Google balked at Facebook’s request that Facebook data be protected in the same fashion as it is in Facebook’s deal with Bing. In essence, Google claimed no way to keep data within circles of friends in the context of a Google search. According to this source: “Senior executives at Google insisted that for technical reasons all information would need to be public and available to all.” But the source goes on to point out that in Google’s own integration of Google+, Google does exactly what it claims it could not do with Facebook data. “The only reason Facebook has a Bing integration and not a Google integration is that Bing agreed to terms for protecting user privacy that Google would not,” this source told me.
Also, and quite interestingly, Google also refused to agree to a clause which stated that Google could not use the data to build its own social network. Now, this is where things can get very dicey. It’s very hard to prove whether or not a company is using the data in particular ways, and had Google agreed to that clause, it might have severely limited its ability to build Google+. What is clear is that Microsoft agreed to Facebook’s terms.

Predictions 2012 #5: A Big Year for M&A

By - January 05, 2012

(image) One of the things that pops out of the “Big Five” chart I just posted, at least if you stare at it a bit, are the places where each company needs to get strong, quickly. Apple is weak in social and one dimensional in ad solutions. Microsoft needs to improve its device products, build out its entertainment distribution muscle, and keep improving search share. Google wants to get better in productivity software, social, and payments. Amazon needs help in devices, social, and OS. Facebook has work to do in many areas, including devices, search, payment, and voice.

When the five largest companies in our space have a lot of needs, they tend to pull out the wallet and go shopping. Sometimes they buy their way into partnerships, but often, they simply buy.

Hence my  fifth prediction for 2012: Expect Internet M&A to heat up, big time. It’s not just going to be the Big Five who drive this trend, it’ll be a whole mess of players looking to consolidate power and press into the double-digit growth market that is the Internet (and by Internet, I also mean mobile and enterprise, of course). Yahoo’s new CEO Scott Thompson knows how to buy companies and has a data focus, for example. That could mean competition to purchase marketing, ad tech, and data companies like Blue Kai, Quantcast, or MarketShare. MediaBank is on a tear and will be on the lookout for similar kinds of companies. IBM has a deep interest in the marketing tech world, expect Big Blue to make some big moves as well. And Twitter will certainly be flexing its muscles, now that it’s bulked up with nearly a billion in fresh capital.

If I had to name a few companies I expect to be in play amongst the Big Five, they would be:

Instagram. This searing hot proof-of-iPhone app is not only a strong social play, it’s a massive image and data goldmine to boot. I could imagine a bidding war for Instagram between Apple (which really needs a social win), Twitter (which could really use a strong photo play), Facebook (which might buy it to keep it out of Apple or Google’s hands), and Google (who would see it as a way to sex up Google+ and Picasa). Of course Yahoo would vie for Instagram as well, but I’m not sure it could win.

Pinterest. It’s social. It’s media. It’s data. Is it a mayfly? Perhaps, but I think it’ll be in play in 2012.

Square. Everyone loves small business, and everyone loves payments. Visa already owns a stake, but that won’t stop Dorsey from landing where he feels the fit is best. That might be Amazon.

Evernote. If any of the Big Five are looking to bolster their productivity suite, Evernote might pique their interest.

These are just off the top of my head, and I’m not a VC (or a daily tech reporter for that matter), so I’ll leave the rest to your imagination. Suffice to say, I predict 2012 is going to be a banner year for tech and Internet M&A. Who do you think will be swept up, and why?

Related:

Predictions 2012: #1 – On Twitter and Media

Predictions 2012: #2 – Twitter As Free Radical, Swiss Bank, Arms Merchant…And Google Five Years Ago

Predictions 2012 #3: The Facebook Ad Network

Predictions 2012 #4: Google’s Challenging Year

Predictions 2011

2011: How I Did

Predictions 2010

2010: How I Did

2009 Predictions

2009 How I Did

2008 Predictions

2008 How I Did

2007 Predictions

2007 How I Did

2006 Predictions

2006 How I Did

2005 Predictions

2005 How I Did

2004 Predictions

2004 How I Did

The Internet Big Five By Product Strength

By -

As I have written in previous predictions, I’ve been focusing on the Internet Big Five lately, and expect that to continue this year, as the group, collectively, are something of a “character” in my upcoming book (as is Twitter, the “free radical”). Other characters include “The Government” and “Corporations,” so expect predictions about those players in the next few days. But today, I want to focus on the Big Five as a whole. I’ve been staring at these companies, trying to understand their strategic imperatives, which is why I found myself making yet another chart.

This one focuses on core product lines where all (or most) of these companies are playing. For me, these product lines, taken together, are the basis of what we might call “the operating system of our lives.” And since the book is about how we will be leveraging our lives over digital platforms in one generation, it struck me as important to assess where each of the Big Five is right now (what they have already built) and where they are weak (what they need to build to compete).

Here’s the chart:

As you can see, I’ve laid out the same five companies, listed top to bottom by market cap. From left to right are columns of various product lines or offerings that I’ve determined are crucial areas that any player in the “OS of our life” must address. I’ve keyed each company against each product line with one of four scores, from “Strong” – where a company already dominates – to “Weak” – where a company either does not play, or has an anemic offering. The terms “Developing” and “Improving” demonstrate that the company is making progress in that area, from either a weak position (“Developing”) or a middling position (“Improving”).

The product lines I determined were worthy of inclusion mirrored many of the territories found in the Web 2 Summit Points of Control map, with some key additions. Starting from the left: If you’re going to be the “OS of life,” it helps if you have experience building operating systems. Next, it’s critical that you have the ability to distribute products and services, in particular entertainment, to folks on your platform. This means dealing with Hollywood, and the Big Five are in various states of disarray with regard to that issue. Third is Productivity Software, which some of the Big Five may well just punt on (Facebook and Amazon, perhaps). Fourth is Advertising Solutions – where all of the Big Five are either major players or developing solutions. Next are Tablets and Phones, which perhaps could also be called a distribution play but are far more than that. After that is Search, which kind of started this whole Web 2 thing back in the day – I gave Apple a “developing” here because of Siri, which I view as a search interface. Next up is Social, which is pretty self explanatory, Payment, a key point of control, and lastly Voice, which I believe (perhaps wrongly) as a critical aspect of user interface.

Why on earth did I go to the trouble of doing this? Well, because it helps me Think Out Loud about how these companies are going to play out over the next couple of years. If you buy that all of these companies need strategies in most of the areas I outline above, then looking for relative weaknesses and strengths of each is an interesting exercise. In fact, if you really squint, you may well see some patterns in future M&A (the subject of my next prediction post, in fact).

I could go on for pages about how I came to each score. For example, I gave Facebook a “developing” in OSes, even though the company really doesn’t have an OS like Windows or iOS. Why? Because I view Facebook as an OS layer on top of the Web, though of course not in the classic sense. And why did Amazon get a “developing” in Voice? Because it just bought a company in the space, just like Apple did with Siri in 2010. I’ll spare you the details of all the rest, but very much invite your comments on the chart. I labeled it “Draft 1″ for a reason. What categories of product did I miss? Were my scores fair? Comment away, please!

Update: I spaced on Xbox/Kinnect, and have updated the chart wrt to Ent/Dist for Microsoft, thanks for the input!

Predictions 2012 #3: The Facebook Ad Network

By - January 04, 2012

For my third prediction of the year, I’m going with one just a tad bit less obvious than “Facebook will go public.” There seems to be no doubt about that event occurring this year, though I’ve certainly heard intelligent folks argue that Facebook can and should figure out how to stay private. I’ve argued that Facebook ought to be a public company, if only to be held (somewhat) accountable given all the data it has on our lives.

But this prediction has to do with Facebook announcing and then launching a web-wide advertising network along the lines of Google’s AdSense. I’ve talked about this for years (short handing it as “FaceSense,”) and I’ve asked Mark Zuckerberg, Carolyn Everson, Bret Taylor, and Sheryl Sandberg about it on stage and off. The answer is always the same: We’re not interested in launching a web ad network at this time.

I predict that line will change in 2012. Here’s why:

- Once public, Facebook will need to keep demonstrating new lines of revenue and growth. Sure, the company already has the attention of 1/7th of all time spent “on the web.” But there’s a lot more attention out there on the Independent Web, and the default ad service for that other 6/7ths is Google’s AdSense, a multi-billion dollar business.

- Facebook already has its hooks into millions of websites with its Open Graph suite – all those Like, Recommend, Share, Connect, and Facebook Comment plugins. These buttons are pumping data about how the web is being used directly into Facebook’s servers. That data can then be combined with all the native Social Graph data Facebook already has, making for a powerful offering to marketers across the entire web. Think of it as “social retargeting” – marketers will be able to buy attention on Facebook.com, then know where folks are across the web, and amplify their messaging out there as well.

- Because Facebook is already integrated into millions of sites, it’ll be a relative snap for the company to start signing up publishers to offer their inventory to the social giant. It will be interesting to see what terms Facebook offers/requires – I’m assuming the company will match Google and others’ non-exclusivity (IE, you can use any ad network you want), but don’t assume this will be the case. Facebook may have an ace or two up their sleeve in how they go to market here.

- Lastly, let’s not forget that the team who built and ran AdSense is now at Facebook (that’d be Sheryl Sandberg and her ad ops chief David Fischer, oh, and one of the “fathers of AdSense,” Gokul Rajaram).

Critical to the success and rollout of Facebook’s web ads will be two key factors. One, the structural underpinning of the system: AdSense scans the content of a page and delivers relevant ads (though many other factors are now creeping into its system). This leverages Google’s core competence as a search engine (it’s already scanning the page for search.) Facebook’s core leverage is knowing who you are and what you’ve done inside the Facebook ecosystem, so the key structural construct for its web ad network will turn on how the company leverages that data. I imagine the new ad network might initially roll out just to sites that have Facebook Connect installed, so that visitors to those sites are already “inside” the Facebook network, so to speak.

The second issue is what may as well be called the “creepiness factor.”  Search display retargeting is still a gray area – a lot of folks don’t like being chased across the web by ads that know what sites you’ve recently visited or what terms you’ve searched for. Cultural acceptance of ads on third party sites that seem to know who your friends are, what you ate for dinner last night, or what movies you recently watched might provoke a societal immune response. But that’s not stopped Facebook to date. I don’t expect it will in this case either.

Related:

Predictions 2012: #1 – On Twitter and Media

Predictions 2012: #2 – Twitter As Free Radical, Swiss Bank, Arms Merchant…And Google Five Years Ago

Predictions 2011

2011: How I Did

Predictions 2010

2010: How I Did

2009 Predictions

2009 How I Did

2008 Predictions

2008 How I Did

2007 Predictions

2007 How I Did

2006 Predictions

2006 How I Did

2005 Predictions

2005 How I Did

2004 Predictions

2004 How I Did

Searchblog 2011: The Year In Writing

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I’ve done this a few times in the past, and this year I’m feeling the need to review all I wrote in 2011, and highlight the best posts (at least, by my own measure). Even though my writing in the past year withered to an average of two or three posts a week, I still managed to get some meaningful ideas out there, and I intend to redouble my efforts in 2012. Herewith, my list of favorites from the past year, in order of appearance:

Predictions 2011 The first substantive post of 2011, by my own reckoning last month, I did pretty well.

What Everyone Seems to Miss In Facebook’s Private or Public Debate… I make the point that a company with this much data should be accountable to the public.

The InterDependent Web In which I expand on my concepts of the Dependent and Independent Web.

File Under: Metaservices, The Rise Of  In this piece I outline a vision for an app world that works,well, like the web should work. One of the top tweeted stories of the year.

Google, Social, and Facebook: One Ring Does Not Rule Them All I forgot I wrote this, but given how Google subsequently dropped Twitter and forced Google+ to the top of its results, re-reading it makes me sad. I wish Google would take my advice.

Do We Trust The Government With The Internet? Surprisingly, I argue that we should.

The Rise of Digital Plumage In which I talk about my concept of instrumenting our digital identities with as much care as we instrument our physical bodies.

The Internet Interest Bubble I’ve been always in the camp of “we’re not in another bubble,” but in this piece, I argue we do have perhaps too much interest in the whole story, at least, too much interest in rather shallow parts of the story.

KSJO 92.3 – Good Product, Bad Marketing. A Case Study One of my favorite anecdotes of the year.

Pandora’s Facebook Box Musings on my desire to use some other service to rethink my Facebook profile.

A Report Card on Web 2 and the App Economy It wasn’t a good score.

Why Color Matters: Augmented Reality And Nuanced Social Graphs May Finally Come of Age Got a ton of comments, but I was wrong about Color. I stand by the principles of the post, however.

A Funny Coincidence, or a Glimpse of the Future? A coincidental glimpse of the future, alas.

Plato On Facebook Change always augurs complaint.

Set The Data Free, And Value Will Follow “Every major (and even every minor) player realizes that “data is the next Intel inside,” and has, for the most part, taken a hoarder’s approach to the stuff.”

Web 2 Map: The Data Layer – Visualizing the Big Players in the Internet Economy A reminder of how much work I did each year getting Web 2 together.

We (Will) Live In A Small Big Town In which I dream of a world where corporations are listening, but not lurking.

What We Hath Wrought: The Book It becomes real, at least, to me!

The World Is An Internet Startup Now One of the most shared pieces I wrote last year.

Time For A New Software Economy As opposed to an app economy.

Google+: If, And, Then….Implications for Twitter and Tumblr Initial reactions to the new service.

“The Information” by James Gleick I read and reviewed a fair number of books this past year, but this one stands out.

Looky Here, It’s Me, In an Ad, On Facebook! Is This Legal? Allowed? Who Knows?! Turns out, it was not allowed. But now Facebook allows it on their own ad network (more on that soon).

Twitter and the Ultimate Algorithm: Signal Over Noise (With Major Business Model Implications) Not surprisingly, one of the most tweeted stories of the year.

We Need An Identity Re-Aggregator (That We Control) This was one of my major issues of the year. It ain’t going away.

The Future of Twitter Ads I found myself writing more and more about Twitter as the year went on.

Facebook As Storyteller On Timeline and industry journalism.

Google = Google+ One of the most shared stories of the year on all counts. In which I argue that Google+ is way more than a new social network. It’s a play for the soul of Google, its brand.

I Wish “Tapestry” Existed It’s too hard to innovate in the area of metaservices for apps.

Only Connect: Facebook, From The Eyes of an Old Newbie Highly read piece on my re-entry to Facebook. I should write a followup on my experience so far.

Government By Numbers: Some Interesting Insights Tons of data on government as a percentage of GDP, etc.

Brands as Publishers One of my chestnuts.

You Are The Platform Summary of one of the most important themes to emerge from the Web 2 Summit last year.

The Problem and the Opportunity Of Mobile Advertising A story of where we are and where we might go.

The World In One Generation: Population Trends This blew up on StumbleUpon. Go figure.

“We need some angry nerds” SOPA rears its head.

The Internet Big Five Part of my book work (as are others above, come to think of it), and increasingly part of this site going forward.

On This Whole “Web Is Dead” Meme It’s not dead.

2011 Predictions: How Did I Do? Not bad.

 

Well, there ya go. A fair number of “favorite posts” for what was a pretty light year of writing. Looking forward to 2012….

Predictions 2012: #1 – On Twitter and Media

By - January 03, 2012

2012 is going to be a year of contrasts – of consolidation of power for the Internet Big Five, and fragmentation and disruption of that power due to both startups as well as government and consumer action. I’ve spent the past few weeks jotting down thoughts for 2012, and hope to do the Year That Is About To Be justice in the following set of posts.

Yes, I said “set of posts,” because for the first time since the birth of this blog (that’d be nine years ago), I’m going to post my predictions one by one. Why? Well, because I’d like to dig in a bit on each. If I do it all in one post, we’d have a *very* long read, and most of you are just too busy for that. I don’t plan to release these posts slowly, I’m just going to write till I’m done, so ideally I’ll be done in a few days. And when I’ve finished, I’ll post a summary of them all, for those of you who want all these predictions in one easily linkable place.

So let’s start with Prediction #1: Twitter will become a media company, and the only “free radical of scale” in our Internet ecosystem. 

Let me break this into two parts. First, the media company angle. We’ve seen this movie over and over again, with Google and Facebook the most notable “new media companies” of the past decade (and Microsoft the most reluctant). Most engineering-driven Valley companies resist the mantle of “media company,” though Facebook seems to be adapting rapidly to that fact. Its key executives make a point of declaring themselves in the business of selling advertising, and if the new Timeline feature isn’t a play to create the world’s biggest media company at scale, then either A/I’m crazy or B/no one else is paying attention. I doubt the latter is true. The former, well…

Now, Twitter is an engineering-driven company, but its future rests in its ability to harness the attention of its consumers, then resell that attention to marketers. If that sounds crass, I don’t mean it to be. Twitter has a chance to do what Google did – at least initially – provide a platform for advertising that actually adds value to the ecosystem in which it lives. Twitter’s initial platform for ads is pointed generally in that direction – Promoted Tweets only get “resonance” if people engage with them, for example. But it’s about to get more complicated.

Here’s why. When Twitter rolled out its mostly-lauded new design late last year, it added a new section to all of our accounts. Can’t remember what it’s called? You’re probably not alone. Twitter’s new “#Discover” section reputedly addresses what I’ve called the service’s greatest problem and opportunity: How to filter all that Twitter noise into a signal that adds unique value to each individual account.

If Twitter gets #Discover right, it’s created an extraordinary media consumption machine. But so far, #Discover ain’t there yet.

You know what is close to there, when it comes to creating a new kind of media consumption service? Flipboard. And that might make for a few uncomfortable board meetings over at Twitter HP, because Flipboard CEO Mike McCue sits on Twitter’s board. Inevitably, Twitter’s #Discover needs to beat Flipboard at its own game. In the end, Twitter may have to buy McCue’s company (or Mike may have to recuse himself from an awful lot of meetings).

And that’s not the only thing that’s “complicated” about getting #Discover right. As Flipboard has already figured out, once you curate copyrighted material at scale, and then want to sell ads against your curation, things get tricky. This is why Flipboard has spent so much time negotiating rights deals with major publishers.   And this will become a major part of Twitter’s work in 2012; work that, to my point, is the work of a media company.

Once Twitter fixes its #Discover problem, an entirely new front opens up for the company in terms of advertising. I find consuming Twitter on Flipboard eerily similar to reading a good magazine, and I don’t think that’s a coincidence. And good magazines already have a good advertising model called the full-page ad (and the two-page spread). I predict that Twitter’s rise as a media company (along with the success of Flipboard and various at-scale “magazine-like” apps like Wired and The Daily) will augur a new ad unit we can either swipe past, or engage with. New formats like these need a scale player to really drive them into the minds of ad buyers, and Twitter will be that driver (yes, there’s Zite, and Livestand,  Google’s supposedly upcoming Propeller, and and and…but.) This ad format will be a huge hit with marketers, and the subject of many fawning industry press mentions.

My second post will expand on the latter part of my first prediction: Twitter as the only “free radical at scale.” Watch for that later today. And Happy 2012!

Related:

Predictions 2011

2011: How I Did

Predictions 2010

2010: How I Did

2009 Predictions

2009 How I Did

2008 Predictions

2008 How I Did

2007 Predictions

2007 How I Did

2006 Predictions

2006 How I Did

2005 Predictions

2005 How I Did

2004 Predictions

2004 How I Did